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Abstract
In recent years, the early detection of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in poultry has become increasingly
important, given their potential to mutate into highly pathogenic viruses. However, evaluations of LPAI surveillance have
mainly focused on prevalence and not on the ability to act as an early warning system. We used a simulation model based
on data from Italian LPAI epidemics in turkeys to evaluate different surveillance strategies in terms of their performance as
early warning systems. The strategies differed in terms of sample size, sampling frequency, diagnostic tests, and whether or
not active surveillance (i.e., routine laboratory testing of farms) was performed, and were also tested under different
epidemiological scenarios. We compared surveillance strategies by simulating within-farm outbreaks. The output measures
were the proportion of infected farms that are detected and the farm reproduction number (Rh). The first one provides an
indication of the sensitivity of the surveillance system to detect within-farm infections, whereas Rh reflects the effectiveness
of outbreak detection (i.e., if detection occurs soon enough to bring an epidemic under control). Increasing the sampling
frequency was the most effective means of improving the timeliness of detection (i.e., it occurs earlier), whereas increasing
the sample size increased the likelihood of detection. Surveillance was only effective in preventing an epidemic if actions
were taken within two days of sampling. The strategies were not affected by the quality of the diagnostic test, although
performing both serological and virological assays increased the sensitivity of active surveillance. Early detection of LPAI
outbreaks in turkeys can be achieved by increasing the sampling frequency for active surveillance, though very frequent
sampling may not be sustainable in the long term. We suggest that, when no LPAI virus is circulating yet and there is a low
risk of virus introduction, a less frequent sampling approach might be admitted, provided that the surveillance is intensified
as soon as the first outbreak is detected.
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Introduction
The surveillance and control of avian influenza (AI) have
historically focused on the detection and eradication of infections
with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses in poultry
populations. However, since low pathogenicity AI (LPAI) viruses
of the H5 and H7 subtypes can mutate into HPAI viruses, as
occurred for example in 1999 in Italy [1] and in 2003 in Chile [2],
the detection and control of LPAI has become compulsory in the
European Union (EU) [3]. Moreover, in 2008, the rapid mutation
of an LPAI H7N7 virus strain (2–3 weeks after its introduction)
that resulted in the HPAI outbreak in the United Kingdom and
evidence of multiple incursions of different AI viruses in EU in
recent years have highlighted the need for early detection [4].
For HPAI, early detection has been successfully based on
passive surveillance (i.e., the observation of signs and symptoms),
given that infection induces clear clinical signs and high mortality
in most poultry species. However, for LPAI, the signs may go
unnoticed by passive surveillance and mortality is low [5]. For this
reason, active surveillance is performed (i.e., visiting farms and
sampling animals for diagnostic tests) [6].
In the EU, current AI surveillance focuses on determining the
presence of infections with subtypes H5 and H7 in different
poultry species [3,6]. To this end, sampling strategies have been
set up to detect a fixed design prevalence with a certain probability
(i.e., assuming minimum detectable prevalences (i.e., design
prevalences) of 5% LPAI infected holdings and 30% infected
animals within an infected holding). However, these methods
neglect the dynamics of the infection in the population and may
result in missed or delayed detection [4].
Over the years, both the number of EU Member States that
have implemented AI surveillance and the number of samples
tested have increased. However, evaluations of the effectiveness of
LPAI surveillance programs have mainly focused on their
performance in establishing the presence of infected birds or
assessing freedom from infection [7,8] and not on their
performance as early warning systems for new introductions. For
this reason, an optimal design for early warning surveillance has
not been defined.
Italy is the EU country with the largest number of AI outbreaks,
and it was the first to implement an AI surveillance system, which
also consisted of the routine laboratory testing of poultry farms [9].
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epidemics have occurred, in 2000–2001, 2002–2003, 2004, and
2005, in addition to two small epidemics in 2007 and 2009, which
mainly involved non-industrial flocks. Given that this is the longest
running surveillance system in Europe, a large quantity of data has
been collected, which, together with the experience gained, could
be useful in evaluating and improving surveillance programmes. In
fact, in a previous study [10] we investigated the transmission
dynamics of LPAI within turkey farms using serosurveillance data
from the above epidemics and experimental infection data. That
study showed that the basic reproduction number (R0) within
farms was on average 5.5, meaning that an infectious turkey infects
on average 5.5 turkeys within a susceptible farm, although R0
varied greatly among farms. Furthermore it resulted in final
estimates for the mean latent and infectious periods of 2.9 and 8.1
days, respectively, and provided a mathematical model to simulate
within-farm outbreaks of LPAI.
The objective of the present study was to evaluate different
surveillance strategies in terms of their capacity to act as early
warning systems for LPAI epidemics in an area with a high risk of
virus exposure. To this end, we carried out simulations with a
model parameterized with data from the Italian LPAI epidemics
[10]. Although future outbreaks will probably be with different
strains and in different areas, this is the model that combines most
available field data and therefore represents the best available
knowledge. The strategies differed in terms of the number of
samples collected, sampling frequency, the type of laboratory tests
performed, whether or not active surveillance was performed, and
when active surveillance was begun. Our simulations were based
on actual data and were performed considering turkeys, which has
been the most affected species in Italy.
Methods
We compared surveillance strategies by simulating within-farm
outbreaks. As output measures, we used the proportion of infected
farms (i.e. outbreaks) that are detected and the farm reproduction
number (Rh) (i.e., the average number of outbreaks caused by one
infectious farm) of an infected farm at detection, assuming that the
farm is not infectious to other farms after detection (e.g., because
of culling or quarantine). The proportion of infected farms that are
detected provides an indication of the sensitivity of the surveillance
system to detect within-farm infections. It is a result of surveillance
that is easier observed in the field but has no direct relation to Rh,
which, in turn, reflects the effectiveness of outbreak detection: an
Rh of ,1 at detection (i.e., the threshold value to prevent an
epidemic) means that the infection is detected (and stopped) at an
early stage, so that epidemics can be brought under control.
Within-farm surveillance model
Within-farm outbreaks were simulated by means of the
stochastic susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) model
(baseline model) of Comin et al. [10]. The parameters are given in
Table 1. Farms were assumed to consist of a single flock.
Outbreaks started at a uniform random flock age with one latently
infected bird. We assumed that the latent and infectious periods
had a gamma distribution, with average durations of 2.9 and 8.1
days, respectively [10]. During their infectious period, birds
transmitted the virus to susceptible birds within the farm at rate b,
which was chosen such that the mean number of secondary cases
generated by one infectious bird (i.e., R0) is equal to 5.5 [10].
Simulations were carried out using R [11].
Detection may take place by passive or active surveillance. For
passive surveillance, we assumed that detection occurs when the
proportion of infected birds was sufficient for allowing clinical
disease to be detected in the farm, which occurred when the
within-farm prevalence reached the detection threshold, D (see
below for estimation of D). For active surveillance, detection could
occur on specific sampling days, depending on the surveillance
strategy (e.g., 60, 90, and 120 days after the onset of the
production cycle in the reference strategy). On a given sampling
day, a random sample of birds was taken, and if at least one of
them was infectious (i.e., positive virological test) or had recovered
from infection (i.e., positive serological test), then the sampling day
was defined as detection day.
Once an infected farm was detected, the expected number of
farms infected secondarily prior to detection was calculated by
multiplying the bird-to-farm transmission rate (bh, the average
number of farms infected by one infected bird per unit of time) by
the cumulative number of infectious birds (area under the curve,
AUC) up to the detection day. If an outbreak was still not detected
on the last sampling day, the AUC at the time of slaughter was
used (Figure 1.b). By repeating this for many simulated outbreaks,
the mean of bh*AUC was computed, which is interpreted as the
between-farm reproduction number Rh (i.e., the mean number of
farms infected by a single infected farm).
Estimation of D, the detection threshold for passive
surveillance
To estimate D, we used the field data provided by the intensive
surveillance system in place in Italy during the LPAI epidemics,
which is described in detail elsewhere [9]. During and around the
time of the epidemics, a total of 6,102 poultry farms were routinely
visited; there were more than 13,000 sampling events, and 497
outbreaks (i.e., infected farms) were detected. For the calculation of
D, we used data from only unvaccinated infected turkey farms
with multiple samplings and available information on farm size,
mean sampling interval, mean sample size and whether the
outbreak had been detected by active or passive surveillance.
Because many records were incomplete, we also included farms
consisting of multiple flocks to increase the number of data points.
As outbreaks on farms generally start in one flock and will be
detected in that flock, we believe that inclusion of these multiple-
flock farms is valid. Based on these criteria, 96 turkeys farms were
selected: 72 (75%) were detected by active surveillance and 24
(25%) by passive surveillance. Unfortunately, we could not directly
use the data from the 24 flocks detected by passive surveillance,
because they did not contain any information about the
prevalence at the time of clinical suspicion, since sample
collections are always performed some days later, after farmer’s
notification. As an alternative, we assumed that passive detection is
related to the prevalence of infectious birds, as that probably best
reflects the clinical picture on the farm. The prevalence threshold
for passive detection, D, was thus determined by first simulating
outbreaks with flock sizes and active surveillance scheme as in the
dataset, and then looking what threshold prevalence would have
resulted in 24 farms being detected by passive rather than active
surveillance (as in the dataset).
Following this assumption, to estimate D we simulated 100 sets
of 96 outbreaks, using the average flock sizes reported in the
aforesaid dataset and the corresponding 96 farm-specific sampling
intervals and sample sizes (Table 2). This resulted in 96 detection
times for each set of simulations and 96 peak prevalences at or
before the day of active detection. In order to have 24/96
outbreaks detected by passive rather than active surveillance (as in
the data), the minimum detectable prevalence was selected as the
24
th highest peak prevalence. In brief, we performed the following
steps:
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sample size being the same as in the data
2. determine the maximum of all prevalences until the day of
detection for each outbreak
3. arrange the maximum prevalences in order and select the 24
th
highest as the minimum detectable prevalence
4. repeat 1–3 100 times to have 100 minimum detectable
prevalences
5. determine mean and 95% confidence interval
Estimation of bh
The bird-to-farm transmission rate bh represents the number of
newly infected farms generated by a single infectious bird housed
in an infected farm per unit of time. For estimation of bh, the
relation Rh=bh*AUC can be reversed for a known value Rh’
during an epidemic, and a mean AUC’ of actual flocks during that
same epidemic: bh=R h’/AUC’. For this calculation, we used a
published value of Rh’ of 2.15, which was the farm reproduction
number at the beginning of the Italian 2000–2001 LPAI epidemic,
when no control measures were in place yet [12]. The value of
Table 1. Parameters used in the within-farm transmission model (from Comin et al [10]).
value in the baseline model parameters’ value
time step 0.02 days -
simulation period 130 days -
farm size 10,000 turkeys -
day of virus introduction ,uniform(a; b) a=0; b=130
farm-specific basic reproduction number ,gamma(s; r)
1 s=2.73; r=0.49
bird-specific duration of latent period ,gamma(sL;r L)s L=17.41; rL=5.95
bird-specific duration of infectious period ,gamma(sI;r I)s I=4.64; rI=0.57
Footnote:
1s=shape parameter; r=rate parameter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.t001
Figure 1. Area under the prevalence curve (AUC, shaded area). (a) AUC assuming that the infectivity is efficiently stopped at day of outbreak
detection. (b) AUC in the whole infectious period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.g001
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outbreaks in 1000 single-flock farms with different flock sizes and
gender of birds (randomly selected from a list of single-flock turkey
farms available at the Regional poultry farm registry), assuming
the absence of any control measure. For each outbreak, we
simulated the day of virus introduction (from day 0 to 100 or 130
of the production cycle, depending on the gender of the turkeys)
and the infection dynamics, using the above-described SEIR
model and parameters. We assumed that the infection process in a
farm continued until it reached its end or the production cycle was
stopped (i.e., because control measures were not in place)
(Figure 1.b). After repeating the simulation 1000 times, we
calculated the mean and 95% confidence interval of the AUC in
absence of control measures.
Simulation of surveillance strategies
To simulate different surveillance strategies, we combined the
information on within- and between-farm disease dynamics, the
number of samples, the frequency of sampling, and the type of
surveillance (passive, active, or both, and whether virological or
serological testing was performed), and the detection ability of
passive surveillance, assuming that a farm stopped being infective
immediately after detection.
In the reference surveillance strategy, we assumed a combina-
tion of both active and passive surveillance applied to a single-flock
farm of 10,000 male turkeys. Sampling for active surveillance was
assumed to start at day 60 of the production cycle (based on the
results of Comin et al. [9]) and to be performed on a monthly basis
(as in Mulatti et al. [12]). At each sampling, we assumed that 10
birds were tested by means of both serological and virological
assays (assuming perfect accuracy for both tests, which was relaxed
in sensitivity analyses, see below). If the sample included at least
one positive bird, the farm was considered to be infected and the
corresponding sampling day was defined as the detection day.
However, if the prevalence of infectious birds had exceeded the
threshold D before positive samples were found, we assumed that
the infection had been found by passive surveillance and the first
day on which the prevalence exceeded the threshold was
considered as the detection day.
The reference strategy was compared to six alternatives,
namely: starting the active surveillance at day 30 of the production
cycle, increasing the sampling frequency to once every 15 days,
decreasing the sampling frequency to once every 60 days,
collecting 30 samples per sampling, performing only serological
testing, and applying only passive surveillance (Table 3). For each
surveillance strategy we calculated the AUC at detection day (i.e.,
the area under the prevalence curve until detection day)
(Figure 1.a) and at different time points after detection day (i.e.,
from 1 to 10 days), given that in reality culling is not performed on
detection day. The farm reproduction number of an infected farm
at the different time points was calculated by multiplying the
AUCs by bh.
Sensitivity analysis
The simulated surveillance strategies referred to the Italian
situation at the beginning of the 2000–2001 LPAI epidemic, when
the first outbreaks appeared and no control measures were in
place. To investigate how the surveillance strategies would
perform under different conditions, we simulated some alternative
scenarios (Table 4), exploring adjustment of the strategy by
varying parameters one by one. In particular we assumed:
a) imperfect sensitivity (Se) of serological testing;
b) imperfect sensitivity of virological testing;
c) larger farm size;
d) smaller farm size;
e) earlier virus introduction;
f) later virus introduction;
g) longer mean generation time (i.e., generation time is defined
as the mean time interval between infection of a primary case
and infection of secondary cases caused by the primary case);
h) shorter mean generation time;
i) higher mean basic reproduction number;
j) lower mean basic reproduction number.
Results
The average threshold prevalence for outbreak detection by
passive surveillance was 56.0% (95%CI: 55.5–56.5%), meaning
that on average roughly half of the birds in the farm would have to
be simultaneously infected (i.e., virus-positive) for LPAI infection
to be clinically suspected. The estimated mean AUC at the end of
the outbreaks was 57,061 birds (95%CI: 54,162–59,960), which,
when divided into Rh in the absence of control measures [12],
yields the number of farms that one infectious bird can infect per
day: bh=3.768?10
25 (95%CI: 3.586?10
25–3.970?10
25).
Table 5 and Figure 2.a summarize the results of the surveillance
strategies under the reference epidemiological scenario (i.e., early
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the farm characteristics and surveillance schemes in the 96 turkey farms selected to estimate the
detection threshold for passive surveillance.
mean SD 5
th percentile 95
th percentile
number of birds per farm 14 000 7856 5075 26 825
number of flocks per farm 2.2 1.5 1 5
number of birds per flock 8139 6496 2317 18 050
duration of the production cycle (days) 138 22 98 163
day of first sampling 65.1 22.6 29.0 103.0
day of detection 109 23 65 141
number of sampling events per farm 3.2 1.2 2.0 5.3
average sampling interval per farm 23.5 12.1 10.2 49.5
average number of samples collected per flock 6.2 3.3 2.3 10
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.t002
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measures). When considering the reference surveillance strategy,
73% of the infected farms were detected, on average 35 days after
virus introduction and mainly by active surveillance (54% of
infected farms, 74% of detected outbreaks). The simulation of
alternative surveillance strategies suggested that decreasing the
sampling frequency from once a month to once every two months
leads to detection on average 43 days after virus introduction, and
performing only passive surveillance reduces the detection rate to
26% of infected farms, thus making it impossible to detect the
infection soon enough for avoiding the spread of the virus to other
farms (i.e. Rh.1).
The detection rate of the reference surveillance strategy under
different scenarios (sensitivity analysis) is shown in Figure 2.b. The
use of imperfect diagnostic tests (90% and 85% sensitivity for
serological and virological testing, respectively) did not result in a
significant decrease in the percentage of detected outbreaks.
Furthermore, surveillance was more sensitive in smaller farms.
The reference scenario refers to the LPAI virus that was
introduced in Italian farms at the beginning of the LPAI epidemic
in 2000; if a strain with a higher R0 was introduced, the role of
passive surveillance would seemingly be enhanced.
To better understand the effectiveness of the surveillance
strategies under different scenarios, we determined the maximum
number of days after detection day at which Rh was still below 1,
which indicates the time available to prevent an epidemic
(Figure 3). When considering the reference (or ‘‘baseline’’)
scenario, to prevent an epidemic, between-farm transmission
would need to be stopped by control measures within 2 days of the
positive sampling. The use of imperfect diagnostic tests (i.e., lower
test sensitivity) did not result in a significant worsening of the
effectiveness of the surveillance strategies. When increasing the
sampling frequency (once every 15 days), the maximum number of
days allowed for preventing an epidemic increased to 5 (i.e.,
providing 3 more days to stop between-farm transmission).
Increasing the sample size (30 birds) also increased the maximum
number of days for preventing an epidemic (i.e., 4 days). By
contrast, performing only passive surveillance made it impossible
to detect infection in time to sufficiently reduce transmission to
other farms (i.e., Rh.1), except in the case of small farms or late
virus introduction. Similarly, the use of only serological testing did
Table 3. Summary of the investigated surveillance strategies.
Surveillance strategy: sampling days surveillance components
a # samples per sampling tests
b
REFERENCE 60–90–120 AS+PS 10 ST+VT
START DAY 30 30–60–90–120 AS+PS 10 ST+VT
FREQ 15 DAYS 60–75–90–105–120 AS+PS 10 ST+VT
FREQ 60 DAYS 60–120 AS+PS 10 ST+VT
30 SAMPLES 60–90–120 AS+PS 30 ST+VT
ONLY SEROLOGY 60–90–120 AS+PS 10 ST only
ONLY PS - only PS - -
Footnote:
aAS=active surveillance; PS=passive surveillance.
bST=serological testing; VT=virological testing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.t003
Table 4. Summary of the alternative scenarios investigated in the sensitivity analysis.
Reference settings mean R0
mean generation
time (days)
farm size
(turkeys)
serological
test Se
virological
test Se
mean virus
introduction
(days)
5.55* 7.90* 10000 100% 100% 54.71
Lower serological test sensitivity Sensitivity of serological test=90%
1
Lower virological test sensitivity Sensitivity of virological test=85%
1
Larger farm size 20000 turkeys in the farm
Smaller farm size 5000 turkeys in the farm
Earlier virus introduction Virus introduction: on average 27.18 days after the onset of the production cycle [introduction day,uniform(a; 54.71)]
Later virus introduction Virus introduction: on average 80.94 days after the onset of the production cycle [introduction day,uniform(54.71; b)]
Longer generation time Mean generation time: 11.85 days [LP,gamma(sL;r L/1.5); IP,gamma(sI;r I/1.5)]
Shorter generation time Mean generation time: 5.27 days [LP,gamma(sL;r L*1.5); IP,gamma(sI;r I*1.5)]
Higher R0 Mean basic reproduction number: 11.19 [R0,gamma(s; r/2)]
Lower R0 Mean basic reproduction number: 3.11 [R0,gamma(s; r*2)]
*values derived from Comin et al. [10].
1values based on van der Goot et al. [13].
Footnote: values of parameters a, b, sL,r L, sI,r I, s and r are those previously reported in Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.t004
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of lower R0 or late virus introduction.
Discussion
In this study, we evaluated diverse surveillance strategies for the
purpose of early warning of LPAI epidemics, considering the
actual epidemiological conditions during the Italian LPAI
surveillance programme in 2000. Surveillance was only successful
in preventing an epidemic if actions were taken within two days of
sampling, which is rather unfeasible, given the waiting time to
have the results from the laboratory. The sensitivity analysis
showed that the surveillance strategies are not effective for larger
farms or if the LPAI virus is introduced in the farm earlier or has a
shorter generation time or a higher R0. In the last three scenarios,
a high infectivity level is reached before detection (i.e., high AUC
at detection), which results in an Rh.1; on the other hand, under
these circumstances the detection rate is higher (i.e., ,80–90%,
Figure 2.b) mostly due to the increase of the detection by passive
surveillance. Furthermore, the surveillance strategies do not seem
to be affected by the quality of the diagnostic test within the range
examined (range based on van der Goot et al. [13]), although
performing both serological and virological assays is important for
Figure 2. Percentages of outbreaks detected by active and passive surveillance. (a) Various surveillance schemes under the reference
scenario. (b) Reference surveillance scheme under different scenarios (i.e., sensitivity analysis). Footnote: Se=sensitivity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.g002
Table 5. Detection ability towards LPAI infections in absence of control measures (reference scenario).
Surveillance model
proportion of
outbreaks that
are detected
proportion of
outbreaks that are
detected by active
surveillance
mean detection time
since virus
introduction (days)
mean prevalence in the
farm at detection Rh at detection [95%CI]
REFERENCE 73.4% 53.6% 34.9 31.3% 0.80 [0.75–0.85]
START DAY 30 73.5% 55.4% 34.5 30.6% 0.77 [0.72–0.82]
FREQ 15 DAYS 74.0% 58.5% 30.8 27.7% 0.53 [0.49–0.57]
FREQ 60 DAYS 65.2% 48.2% 43.2 27.6% 1.21 [1.14–1.28]
30 SAMPLES 81.3% 63.5% 34.9 26.5% 0.62 [0.57–0.66]
ONLY SEROLOGY 68.3% 44.9% 36.5 34.5% 1.05 [0.99–1.11]
ONLY PS 26.1% – 22.4 59.2% 1.48 [1.41–1.55]
Results of 1000 simulated outbreaks applying different surveillance strategies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.t005
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that preventive action must be taken as soon as possible, imperfect
diagnostic tests which provide results quickly may be preferable to
a higher-quality assay that takes longer.
The comparison of different sampling strategies showed that
increasing the sampling frequency is the most effective means of
improving the timeliness of detection (i.e., Rh is minimized) but
that increasing the sample size increases the likelihood of detection
(i.e. smaller outbreaks have a higher chance to be detected). This
has also reported for the surveillance of other viral and bacterial
infectious diseases, in particular, bovine herpesvirus I [14],
Mycobacterium bovis [15], and Salmonella enteritidis [16]. However,
it has been demonstrated that there is a limit to optimization by
increasing the frequency and decreasing the sample size, given that
if the size of the sample is too small, then the specificity of the
surveillance decreases [16].
The reference scenario was the epidemiological situation at the
beginning of the first Italian LPAI epidemic, when no compulsory
biosecurity measures were in place. At present, commercial turkey
farms must be managed according to strict biosecurity measures
[17], which consist of physical and temporal barriers, cleaning,
and disinfection. Given that such measures reduce both the risk of
incursion of AI viruses in individual production units (i.e.,
bioexclusion) and the risk of outward transmission (i.e., biocon-
tainment) [18], the current between-farm transmission may be
lower than that in 2000, which could imply that current LPAI
surveillance in Italy is more effective than indicated by our results.
We simulated passive surveillance using a threshold value, yet in
reality passive surveillance depends on many factors, such as the
virus strain, the infectious dose, the individual susceptibility of the
farm (which may be enhanced, for instance, by concurrent
infections with other pathogens), and the awareness of the farmer.
However, our intention was to simulate a situation in which a
certain percentage of outbreaks would be detected by passive
surveillance, which is related to the efficiency with which infection
spreads in the farm. Of the outbreaks simulated, about 26% were
detected by passive surveillance (Table 5), which is consistent with
the data from the 96 actual outbreaks (25%). However, in
simulated outbreaks based on the 96 real farms (Table 2), 37%
would have reached the threshold (i.e., if they had not been
detected beforehand by active surveillance or had not terminated
too early because of the end of the production cycle) (data not
shown). This result is consistent with the estimated sensitivity of
passive surveillance for LPAI in chickens reported by Alba et al.
(2010) [8] using a scenario-tree approach (i.e., 36%, assuming a
design prevalence at holding level of 5%).
Although we chose to focus our evaluation on LPAI in turkeys,
we can speculate on how the surveillance strategies would perform
in chickens. Chickens are known to be less susceptible to LPAI
infection than turkeys [19,20] and laboratory experiments have
shown that bird-to-bird transmission of LPAI viruses in chickens
can be low to moderate, depending on the virus strain [21,22].
Furthermore, in densely populated poultry areas with both turkey
and chicken farms, LPAI outbreaks have often occurred only on
turkey farms, for example in Virginia in 2002 [23], in Italy in 2004
and 2005 [24], and in Germany in 2008 [25]. We can thus assume
that both within- and between-farm transmission of LPAI
infections are less efficient in chickens than in turkeys, as supported
by the fact that, to date, no massive LPAI epidemics have been
reported in chickens [26,27]. However, a distinction should be
made between broilers and layers, which have different rearing
systems and lengths of production life. Although for layers passive
surveillance based on decreases in egg production and feed intake
has in some cases contributed to the prompt recognition of LPAI
[28], the early detection of LPAI can be difficult to achieve in
broilers unless many samples are tested very frequently.
Current EU legislation on the control of avian influenza focuses
on early detection and prompt reaction in the event of an outbreak
[3]; however, the primary goal of EU surveillance programmes for
AI in poultry is to detect the annual presence of infections caused
by the subtypes H5 and H7 of HPAI and LPAI [6]. Active
surveillance programmes that include only one sampling event per
production cycle probably result in missed or late detection of
LPAI virus incursions in turkeys.
In conclusion, in this study, we tested a number of surveillance
strategies that can be used for the early detection of LPAI
infections, thus preventing major epidemics and the possibility of a
virulence shift to HPAI. Early detection of LPAI outbreaks in
turkeys can be achieved through the combination of passive and
active surveillance. Passive surveillance may be quite effective
Figure 3. Effectiveness of outbreak detection. Grey-scale plot indicating the maximum number of days after positive sampling to efficiently
stop the infection (i.e. last day at which Rh,1) for alternative surveillance strategies under different scenarios. Footnote: The number reported in
each cell represents the last day at which Rh,1 for that specific combination of surveillance and scenario (light=better, dark=worse).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035956.g003
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on which our model parameters were based (circulating in Italy in
2000–2005), active surveillance is needed as well. Concerning the
sampling strategies for active surveillance, increasing the sampling
frequency to once every 15 days leads to prompt detection,
providing 5 days to react after taking a positive sample to prevent a
major epidemic (Rh,1). However, taking samples this frequently
may not be sustainable in the long term, for both economical and
practical reasons. Nonetheless, we deem the above mentioned
strategy specifically suitable for cases in which either an LPAI virus
has been recently introduced in a previously unaffected area or
when the surveillance activities are performed in an area with a
high risk of virus exposure. When no LPAI virus is circulating and
there is no immediate risk of virus introduction, a less frequent
sampling approach might be admitted, provided that the
surveillance is intensified as soon as the first outbreak is detected.
It would be useful to address such risk-based optimization of
surveillance in a future study.
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